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Reviewed by David Brandenberger, University of Richmond
The exigencies of war in the days and weeks following Germany’s invasion of the So-
viet Union in 1941 forced Soviet ideologists to augment traditional Marxist-Leninist
propaganda with more populist rallying calls. Although many of these new appeals
were designed to resonate with ordinary Russians’ religious and national sentiments,
attempts were also made to court public opinion among the non-Russian population.
Party organizations in the national republics and autonomous regions were given con-
siderable latitude to make the case for war. At the same time, ªve anti-fascist commit-
tees were set up at the all-union level to mobilize support for the USSR abroad among
groups ranging from scientists and women to the international Slavic community as a
whole. Best known among these organizations was the Jewish Anti-Fascist Committee
(JAC), which not only conducted international fundraising and propaganda work but
also served as something of a domestic lobby for Soviet Jews who lacked more formal
representation within the Communist establishment.
Many of these party organizations and committees were reined in toward the end
of the war after the wane of their mobilizational raison d’être. A number were even re-
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proached for indulging in “bourgeois nationalism” in a wave of reaction that stretched
into the early 1950s. The JAC was the hardest hit when its wartime service was re-
appraised during the mid-to-late 1940s in the context of growing Cold War tensions
and Soviet anti-Semitism. The JAC’s own naïveté may have compounded its prob-
lems, whether in regard to its foreign contacts or to its lobbying activities (most nota-
bly, its bid in 1944 to transform the Crimea into a Jewish autonomous region). In any
case, not only was the JAC disbanded in 1948, but a car accident was staged to elimi-
nate Solomon Mikhoels, its leader, shortly thereafter. From 1949 to 1952, many of
the JAC’s remaining members and associates were quietly arrested, tried, and shot.
Joshua Rubenstein correctly views the elimination of the JAC as part of a larger
anti-Semitic campaign conducted during the last years of Josif Stalin’s reign. After all,
despite the obscurity of the JAC affair, it was clearly linked not only to Mikhoels’s
murder, but also to the subsequent “anti-cosmopolitan” campaigns, the 1951 trial of
Rudolf Slánský in Czechoslovakia, and the 1953 Doctors’ Plot in the Soviet Union.
Rubenstein describes the affair in considerable detail in his introduction to Stalin’s Se-
cret Pogrom, an abbreviated English-language translation of the trial transcript of
ªfteen JAC associates executed in 1952. Edited with V. P. Naumov as part of Yale Uni-
versity Press’s Annals of Communism series, the volume is derived from Naumov’s
longer Russian-language edition, Nepravednyi sud: Poslednii stalinskii rasstrel (Moscow:
Nauka, 1994).
Stalin’s Secret Pogrom is a fascinating volume that presents many challenges as a
historical source. Much of the information about the JAC and its associates contained
in the transcript ought to be treated with great caution. Not only were the charges
trumped-up, but the defendants were tortured, and their testimony was coerced. Nor
should the transcript itself be studied as an orchestrated spectacle of Stalinist propa-
ganda, inasmuch as the trial was held in secret and lacked much of the hyperbole char-
acteristic of the show trials of the 1930s. Instead, the transcript testiªes to the bravery
of many of the defendants, who sought throughout the trial to retract their confes-
sions, proclaim their innocence, and exonerate themselves. Although Nikolai
Bukharin is famous for having attempted to use his 1938 show trial to turn the tables
on the prosecutor Andrei Vyshinskii, his rhetorical game of cat-and-mouse pales be-
fore the aggressive defense mounted by the JAC defendants. Their testimony ulti-
mately spurred Aleksandr Cheptsov, the presiding judge at the JAC trial, to ask
Georgii Malenkov (Stalin’s top aide) whether the proceedings could be suspended to
allow for further investigation—a futile request that had no tangible effect on the
murderous outcome of the affair.
It may be that Stalin’s Secret Pogrom ought to be considered a martyrological doc-
ument rather than a historical source per se, not only because of the peculiar circum-
stances under which the trial took place, but also because of the form in which the
transcript itself has appeared in print. Although the English text is more than 420
pages long, it represents only a small fraction of the original typescript, which appar-
ently runs eight volumes in length and remains classiªed to the present day. Unfortu-
nately, both the Russian- and the English-language editions are silent about what was
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omitted in order to reduce the original to a manageable size. More worrisome, al-
though the Russian edition includes ellipses to indicate where many of the cuts were
made, the English edition does not. The removal of ellipses in the latter edition
was perhaps a cosmetic effect intended to improve the book’s accessibility, it has the
unintended consequence of weaving what is really a collection of trial excerpts into a
seamless narrative, endowing the text with an artiªcial sense of polish, coherency, and
eloquence that is not present in the Russian edition.
This would be a minor issue were it not for questions raised by Alexei Kojevnikov
in his review of the book—in Russian History/Histoire Russe, Vol. 30, No. 4 (Winter
2003)—regarding the nature of the cuts themselves. Intrigued by the thoughtfulness
of the defendants’ testimony, Kojevnikov took a closer look at how these individuals
“constructed” their autobiographies. He found that the defendants described them-
selves as more-or-less conventional Soviet Jewish cultural ªgures in the English edi-
tion, but when he checked this impression in the longer Russian edition he came
across a more complicated story. There, the defendants styled themselves not only as
Jews, but as loyal Communists and ardent Soviet patriots. According to Kojevnikov,
there are stretches of text missing from the English edition that complicate the defen-
dants’ sense of Jewish identity by exposing their ambivalence in regard to their reli-
gious faith, their preference for Yiddish or Russian over Hebrew, and their skepticism
about the Jewish community abroad. Other missing passages portray the defendants
as ªerce party loyalists who were well-versed in Marxism-Leninism and who were con-
vinced that the Soviet Union was teaming with spies. Most unexpectedly, many of the
defendants apparently regarded each other with considerable hostility and suspicion,
belying a community that was deeply divided against itself.
In all likelihood, the editors of the English edition excised some of this material
in order to make the text more accessible to Western audiences. In particular, they
may have been trying to remove what Russians refer to as shtamp—the numbing com-
bination of ritualized lip service, cliché, and “ofªcialese” that dominates most ofªcial
sources. Purists, however, will question what was gained by such editing. After all, Sta-
lin-era trial transcripts are by deªnition supposed to be shrill, inconsistent, and choked
with outrageous claims and spasms of supplication. Their victims are expected to be
wracked by doubt and conºicting loyalties, in this case having struggled for years to
develop Soviet Jewish culture as somehow “national in form, socialist in content.” Ex-
cessive editing thus simpliªes and distorts the historical record, highlighting the “Jew-
ishness” of the defendants at the expense of their “Sovietness.” Kojevnikov goes so far
as to say that by omitting this material in the English text, the editors inadvertently
make the charges of nationalism, disloyalty, and Jewish exceptionalism leveled against
the JAC defendants seem almost plausible. Readers interested in a full appreciation of
the complex, contradictory nature of Jewish identity during these troubled years may
ªnd it useful to consult the Russian edition of the trial transcript alongside Stalin’s
Secret Pogrom.
✣ ✣ ✣
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